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This article is concerned with assessing just one element of how the Big Three Rating 
Agencies – Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch – have been able to remain profitable 
despite their dreadful performance in the lead-up (and arguably since) the recent Financial 
Crisis; the article argues that the understanding that the Big Three provide ‘Public Goods’ is 
systematically protecting their position. As such, the Big Three are being allowed to 
contribute to hazardous financial practices without the fear of serious reprisals. The article 
demonstrates this narrative and ultimately explains the effect that this narrative has upon the 
ability to understand the Big Three Rating Agencies. Ultimately, the article suggests that in 
order for the regulation of the Rating Industry to be truly effective, the actual output of the 
Big Three Rating Agencies must be clearly recognised, rather than any blanket designation 
attributed to the Industry as a whole remaining prevalent.   
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The credit rating industry has been found to be a direct contributor to the Financial Crisis of 
2007/081. Furthermore, the United States Senate was left in no doubt after its investigations 
into the financial collapse that the Big Three credit rating agencies had systematically 
conducted themselves in a manner opposite to that which they are supposed to do, and indeed 
in a manner in which they themselves promote. However, all three of these agencies have 
been recording an increased rate of profitability year-on-year, with a small blip during the 
actual Financial Crisis. There are a number of reasons for this, which include the potential 
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conflict that exists within financial regulators (regarding their personal incentives)2, and the 
demands of investors3 to name but a few. However, for this analysis a more abstract element 
will be considered. That the Big Three have remained profitable, and have even gone on to 
strengthen their position, should lead us to ask what may be the foundation for this 
paradoxical development. It is entirely rational to believe that companies who behave so 
appallingly, and are found, beyond doubt, to have done so consciously, would suffer 
potentially fatal consequences. Yet, this is clearly not the case and this article suggests that at 
the core of this paradox is the notion that the Big Three, in particular, are creating products 
which are absolutely necessary to the functioning of the economy and, as such, any 
potentially fatal reform, with regard to the agencies, is simply impossible.  
 
The article therefore begins by examining this notion of the output of the Big Three as being 
vitally important to the economy, and therefore modern society. This has been described in 
the literature as the agencies providing a ‘public good’, which has been used in both its 
economic and literal senses. We will see that the use of this narrative is almost absolute in the 
literature, which gives credence to this allegation that the narrative is intellectually supporting 
the transgressions of the Big Three. It is worth mentioning here however, before we progress 
any further, that this article does not seek to admonish those who adopt this narrative; rather, 
it is contended here that this narrative is simply too easy to follow, and that a more in-depth 
and careful analysis reveals that, in actual fact, the output of the Big Three does not fit neatly 
into the ‘public-good’ designation and therefore sells a vision of the agencies which 
perpetuates their position and influence. After looking at the intricacies of this ‘public good’ 
notion, and how the industry came to receive that important designation, the article will 
assess what this narrative is actually based on. It will be argued that the narrative is based on 
two differing aspects: firstly, it is based on how we collectively desire the agencies to 
operate, and secondly upon how the industry as a whole is desired to operate, rather than 
focusing upon the Big Three; this is argued to be a fatal error as the Big Three make up over 
90% of the global output of rating agencies. Finally, the article will assess the actual output 
of the Big Three rating agencies and examine how that output may be altered to fall in line 
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with the requirements of a number of parties – with the most important being the requirement 
of the State in representing society (in theoretical terms). 
 
Intellectual Sustenance 
 
The concept of ‘public good’ is central to this article, so it will be important to clarify what is 
meant by this term. However, before we do that, a simple understanding of what a credit 
rating agency actually is, and what it does, will help set the scene for what follows. An 
understanding of what a rating agency does can be garnered by recognising that ‘a credit 
rating is an opinion provided by a rating agency for a fee on the credit risk or 
creditworthiness of the bond issue, which reflects the probability of default of that bond’4 – 
essentially, a credit rating agency provides an opinion on the likelihood of an investor 
receiving their investment and additional interest back, and within a given timeframe. These 
said investors will usually be investing in ‘bonds’5, which means an agreement between an 
‘issuer’ and the investor that details how the investor will loan money to the issuing 
organisation (‘issuing’ in terms of issuing ‘debt’ i.e. a piece of the company as collateral) 
with the expressed aim of receiving the money back within a certain timeframe, having 
accrued interest for the loan in the meantime. Credit rating agencies began in the mid-1800s 
in the United States (at least as we recognise them today6) and they are now synonymous 
with the accessing of the capital markets, although the so-called ‘sophisticated’ investors, like 
pension funds, will assimilate the opinions of the rating agencies into their own 
creditworthiness analyses7. The capital markets are the basis of modern capitalism as we 
know it8, and as such the credit rating agencies, particularly the traditional powerhouses of 
Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s - also known as the ‘Big Two’ - have therefore parasitically 
grown as a result. Furthermore, this centralised importance has been described in a way that 
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sees the agencies cemented into the economic and public consciousness, and this narrative is 
best described as the ‘public good’ narrative. 
 
The ‘public good’ narrative has two different variants, and these are important to understand 
before we progress. The first understanding, which will be addressed shortly, is the literal 
understanding, in that something is good for the public. This can be seen when something is 
related to the provision of social aspects such as social infrastructure and energy provision. 
The second understanding is based on the economic theory of regulation known as ‘public 
choice’ – a theory developed by economic thinkers like Pigou9, Samuelson10, Stigler11, 
Olsen12, Tullock13, and Coase14 - and describes the provision of a public good as the 
provision of a service which has certain characteristics. For the public choice field, something 
can be considered to be a ‘pure’ public good if it can be described as both nonexcludable and 
nonrival. Nonrival denotes the phenomenon whereby something can be ‘consumed by an 
individual without detracting, in the slightest, from the consumption opportunities still 
available to others from that same unit’15, with a demonstrative example being Forests and 
Algae that consume carbon16. Nonexcludable means that once the product has been provided 
it is very difficult, if not impossible, to exclude others from receiving the benefit, with the 
light from street lights providing a good example17. To provide an opposition in terms of 
comparison, food and fuel are ‘private goods’ in that they have both rival and excludable 
properties18. Before we look at how scholars and onlookers have been using this 
understanding to attribute it to the output of the rating agencies, which this article posits is 
incorrect, there is one other theoretical term that we must familiarise ourselves with, and that 
is an ‘externality’. An externality describes an ‘event which confers an appreciable benefit (or 
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inflicts an appreciable damage) on some person or persons who were not fully consenting 
parties in reaching the decision or decisions which led directly or indirectly to the event in 
question’19, with a more palatable definition being that an externality is an activity that ‘has a 
consequence that confers a (nonpriced) cost or benefit on a nonparticipant’20. 
 
To digress for one moment, the issue of actually providing these public goods has been a 
point of contention within the economic field for some time. Pigou’s most celebrated work in 
this field was based upon the notion that it is the state’s responsibility to provide a public 
good, particularly when a private party will not, or cannot provide it21. However, Ronald 
Coase suggested that it is not necessarily the case that the state will be the best provider of a 
public good, mostly due to a number of constraining features that affect the ability of the state 
to provide a public good in comparison to a private provider22. In order to negate the issue of 
a private provider being unwilling to provide the public good, essentially because they cannot 
capture the benefit of doing so, one scholar has noted that the state will ‘incentivise’ the 
private providers by initiating what they call a ‘public-private-partnership’, which entails the 
state’s facilitation of allowing the private entity to essentially change the dynamic of the 
public good so that it loses, at least to some degree, its nonexcludable or nonrival properties23 
- this phenomenon also relates to the understanding of a ‘quid pro quo’24. 
 
This brings us onto the provision of credit ratings. There are a number of scholars who relate 
the provision of credit ratings to the provision of public goods in the economic sense, with 
Ulrich Schroeter providing perhaps the best example: 
By informing the financial market about their rating opinions, credit rating agencies 
increase the market’s efficiency and lower costs for both issuers and investors. Once 
published, credit ratings possess the characteristics of a public good – their use by one 
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individual does not reduce their availability for use by others (non-rivalry), and no 
one can effectively be excluded from using them (non-excludability)25. 
Manns continues this theme, by discussing how ‘ratings fit squarely within understandings of 
what constitutes a public good’, in that the consumption of the ratings is nonrival because 
there is no marginal cost to expanding its scope of proliferation once created, and that it is 
almost impossible to stop consumers of ratings disseminating the information within the 
rating to those who have not paid for the service26. The focus from scholars regarding this 
issue of the ratings representing public goods is squarely upon this notion of nonexcludability 
because, as Smith and Walter note, agencies generate ‘positive externalities’ with their 
ratings via reducing information costs and ‘dramatically enhancing both static and dynamic 
market efficiency’. The only ‘pressure point’, as the scholars call it, that the agencies have, is 
the ability to charge fees to the issuers of debt, rather than to the investors in debt, who could 
just as easily disseminate the information to non-paying investors27 – a process known as 
‘free riding’28. This phenomenon began in the late 1960s and early 1970s after the collapse of 
Penn Central, a company which was given the highest standard of creditworthiness by a 
competitor of the rating agencies, the National Credit Office29, and which would 
subsequently fail; this led to the marketplace requiring another form of ranking 
creditworthiness, and the rating agencies of S&P and Moody’s were there to meet the 
demand. At the same time, the relatively rapid increase in the public exposure to 
photocopying technology30 essentially forced the hand of the agencies, as they had just lost 
their ability to exclude people from receiving the benefit of their products. This switch from 
the ‘investor-pays’ remuneration model, to the ‘issuer-pays’ model, was certified by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission in 1975 with its official ratification of the top two 
rating agencies who had recently altered their remuneration models31, and thus the creation of 
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a ‘Public Private Partnership’ in the field of credit ratings was officially born (although it is 
worth noting that the state had tried before, but the environment was not susceptible to the 
partnership32). 
 
Many scholars have stated that this element - the element of now providing a product that is 
seemingly nonrival, because everyone can enjoy the benefits of the products and is also 
nonexcludable, because now the issuers pay for the products – is the key determinant to 
categorising the agencies’ products as being ‘public goods’ in the economic sense33. 
However, there are others who attribute a broader understanding of the term ‘public good’ to 
the equation, and that understanding is just as important for our analysis. Mohammed Hemraj 
has stated that rating agencies have ‘become a public good that serves the interest of the 
entire financial system’34, whilst Duan and Van Laere note that ‘credit ratings are therefore 
better viewed as an infrastructure matter, much like roads, air traffic control, and the public 
education system’35. Other scholars have connected the act of rating to the idealistic 
properties of the marketplace moreover, with Botsch stating that the ‘transparent rating of 
assets and liabilities is a public good in open and transparent markets’36. There are a number 
of other scholars who have designated the agencies and their output as being part of a broader 
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‘public good’37, but it is worth asking an important question at this stage: this scholarly 
support for the agencies and their product is consistent and extremely supportive of the 
agencies’ position, but what if it is based on the wrong perception? What if what these 
scholars focus upon is what they desire the agencies to be, rather than what they actually are? 
The repercussions of this misaligned focus would be catastrophic in theory, and the financial 
crisis, unfortunately, provides the practical demonstration of that theoretical understanding. 
 
The Desired Version of the Rating Industry 
 
The credit rating industry has a number of desired qualities which differ depending upon 
one’s position. For issuers, credit rating agencies allow for the transmission of sensitive 
information in a codified form, so that they can attract investment without revealing sensitive 
information – this is known as ‘signalling theory’38. For investors, rating agencies provide 
easily understandable and easily assimilated information upon which they can make 
investment decisions quickly. It also allows dispersed shareholders to constrain the actions of 
their ‘agents’39, so that they may only invest in a certain category of debt, or that certain 
instances may ‘trigger’40 investment actions (like divestment if a company receives a rating 
downgrade, for example). For the state, the rating agencies are required to act in a responsible 
and consistent manner so that they can be included within a regulatory framework, upon 
which larger economic policies can be executed – this may also be referred to as a system 
containing ‘gatekeepers’41.  
 
There are also broader, perhaps even systemic requirements that onlookers have identified. 
Scalet and Kelly note that ‘in the early twentieth century, credit ratings developed as a 
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response to the demands of an investing public that wanted reliable information about 
purchasing securities… Historically, the development of credit ratings included the ethical 
undertone that this information provides a measure of fairness and equality to an investing 
public’42. This ‘ethical undertone’ alludes to the founding of the commercialised rating 
industry by Lewis Tappan, an Evangelical businessman who incorporated piousness into the 
first rating agency43 (although that is a particularly simplistic and perhaps misleading 
understanding44). Scalet and Kelly continue by affirming that ‘reasonably accessible 
investing information is not merely a public good in this respect but an important component 
for creating conditions of justice in a capitalist society, akin to making voting reasonable 
accessible to all in a democratic society’45, which is a representative viewpoint of the esteem 
with which the rating industry is held by concerned scholars. However, the issue for this 
article is that this reverence for what the rating industry is supposed to represent provides an 
intellectual foundation upon which the current rating agencies continue to transgress. The 
scholars who talk of the rating industry in these terms are aware that the current rating 
agencies fall short of this idealistic understanding, of course, but in continuing to prevail with 
this notion of what the industry should be, the narrative provides the agencies with an ideal at 
which it can claim to aim to, thereby solidifying its importance in the minds of the influential. 
For this article, this is an almost central reason as to why the agencies are allowed to 
transgress without a substantial penalty, with the proposed solution being to do away with the 
narrative altogether – we need to only see the rating agencies as they actually are, and then 
continue on that basis. 
 
The Actual Output 
 
The narrative described by this article, namely that rating agencies produce ‘public goods’ 
and are therefore extremely important to society, uses the term ‘rating agencies’ in a broad 
sense, as we have already seen. However,  we should make clear here that the Big Three – 
Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch Ratings – control over 90% of the global rating 
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market between them, with S&P and Moody’s controlling the vast share. Therefore, this 
article asks whether it is appropriate to attach such generalised understandings to an arena 
that bears no comparison to that generalised understanding. There are two elements which 
support this viewpoint of a divergence between what people desire of the agencies, and what 
they actually do, and both provide clear evidence to show that the public good narrative is 
providing support to a particularly dangerous industry. 
 
One of the key elements to the public good narrative is that the agencies, in providing free 
and open access to investors, satisfy the required characteristic of a ‘public good’ in that they 
does not exclude people from using the service, and that consumption of the rating does not 
affect the ability to consume for others. The agencies are keen to support this understanding 
and affirm that anyone can receive the full information on a credit rating46, but research 
shows that this is misinformation. In reality, Langohr and Langohr found that 10% of the 
agencies’ revenues come from investors paying to access information that is secluded behind 
pay-walls, and that the information that can be accessed by everyone is often outdated, 
lacking detailed information, and lacking the rationale for the decision – the scholars 
therefore suggest that what is freely available is nothing more than ‘advertising messages’ for 
investors to purchase the more detailed information47. This is clearly at odds with the ‘access 
to rating’ aspect that supports the perpetual understanding that credit ratings constitute public 
goods. This technical element alone should be enough to show that the current rating 
agencies do not act in accordance with the public good narrative, and therefore the narrative 
should be abandoned. However, the track record of the agencies in terms of their actions 
provides more; it provides evidence that not only are the rating agencies operating in contrast 
to the public good moniker that has been attributed to them, they are actually a public hazard. 
 
The credit rating industry, with particular reference to the Big Two, have been commonly 
recognised as being a major figure in the creation and continuation of the recent financial 
crisis48. The U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ), who had taken the lead on punishing the 
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agencies due to the criminal aspect of their conduct, recently concluded a multi-year 
investigation into the actions of the Big Two and eventually settled with the two firms for 
over $2 billion combined, which represented a record fine for the industry49. During the 
investigation, the DoJ found multiple instances of the two firms conspiring with issuers 
against the position of investors, which is in no way demonstrative of the firms providing a 
public good in the generalist terms some have appropriated. The most famous examples are 
the agencies’ assisting in creating ‘special purpose vehicles’ within which large and 
regulatory-constrained investors invested50. In settling with the DoJ, for a lesser amount than 
Standard and Poor’s owing to a divergence in record-keeping procedures, Moody’s admitted 
to publishing information, regarding the processes involved in creating ratings, that was 
different to the stated methodologies, ultimately meaning that whilst issuers knew of the 
parameters being used by rating agencies to develop ratings, investors were being told 
something completely different, to their detriment51. Moody’s is not alone in this, with S&P 
being banned from rating a certain category of financial products recently because they were 
consciously informing investors that the agency was using a certain set of parameters to rate 
commercial mortgages, whilst in reality they were using different parameters that had only 
been transmitted to the issuers of the mortgage-backed securities52. 
 
These aspects alone, forgetting the fact that the agencies receive 90% of their income from 
issuers of debt for just one moment, are clear examples of why the article is calling for the 
public good narrative to be abandoned. The rating agencies that the narrative talks about 
simply do not exist. What does exist are two very large and very influential agencies which 
have consciously acted against investors since the moment they began charging issuers for 
                                                 
49 For a review on the two cases see Daniel Cash ‘Why the U.S. Department of Justice Must Act Against 
Moody’s Corp’ [2016] 37 Business Law Review 6; Daniel Cash ‘The Conclusion of the Department of Justice’s 
Investigation into Moody’s: Financial Penalties but No Deterrent’ [2017] 38 Business Law Review 3. 
50 King County, Washington, and Iowa Student Loan Liquidity Corporation v. IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG, 
Moody’s Investors Service, Inc., The McGraw Hill Companies, Inc., Fitch, Inc., and Morgan Stanley & Co. 
Incorporated [2012] 863 F.Supp.2d 288 (May 4). See also the resulting case taken by CalPERS, the American 
pension organisation, Complaint for Negligent Misrepresentation under Common Law & California Civil Code 
§§ 1709 & 1710 & Negligent Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage at 23, Cal. Pub. Employees’ 
Ret. Sys. v. Moody’s Corp. (and others), No. CGC-09-490241. 
51 Department of Justice ‘Justice Department and State Partners Secure Nearly $864 Million Settlement with 
Moody’s Arising from Conduct in the Lead Up to the Financial Crisis’ [2017] Office of Public Affairs. 
52 Securities and Exchange Commission Order Instituting Administrative and Cease-and-Desist Proceedings, 
Pursuant to Section 8A of the Securities Act of 1933 and Sections 15E (d) and 21C of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, Making Findings, and Imposing Remedial Sanctions and a Cease-and-Desist Order [2015] Release 
No. 9705; 74104, File No. 3-16348. 
their ratings53. Therefore, the understanding that the agencies include the fact that they 
operate in a manner akin to a public good in their official information, which we have seen 
they do not, is proof that the public good narrative is providing intellectual support to the 
continuation of these organisations that played a facilitative role in one of the most socially-
damaging financial crashes on record. Scholars who contribute to this narrative clearly aim to 
promote an ideal of what rating agencies should be, and for that reason no blame can be 
attached to the proponents of the narrative – however, what the agencies should be is not 
what they are, and their actions provide clear evidence that the agencies have no interest in 
changing; why should they? They are currently experiencing the most profitable chapter in 
their history and are not being punished appropriately for their transgressions. What is 
required now is for the narrative to change, and for the scholarly community to represent one 
understanding – these agencies are venal and self-interested and, based upon their consistent 
actions, cannot be trusted to place anyone’s interest above their own in any form. We, as a 
discipline, are quick to criticise financial regulators for lack of action, or for taking the wrong 
action, but sometimes it is the case that they are misguided by what they understand, and in 
this instance financial regulators are hamstrung by an ideological understanding that 
promotes the rating agencies onto a pedestal that many cannot imagine scaling in order to 
remove them – it is vitally important that this ideological understanding is dismantled so that 
the agencies can be correctly regulated before they become involved in the next systemic 
breakdown. 
 
Conclusion 
 
There are a number of reasons for why the rating agencies were in the centralised position 
that they were prior to the Crisis, and also many other reasons as to why they continue to be 
profitable despite such poor performance. In terms of reasons for the agencies’ survival after 
the Crisis, there are a number of important aspects which have been considered in the 
literature, ranging from the usage of ratings by investors54, the consistent accuracy of 
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corporate bond ratings as opposed to structured bong ratings55, and the lack of a viable 
alternative56, to name but a few. The reasons for why the market continues to adopt the 
ratings of the agencies are therefore many, but they are often of a ‘practical nature’ – they can 
be used by dispersed shareholders to restrict the actions of managers, to provide just one 
example. Yet, in this article we attempted to analyse the situation in a more conceptual 
fashion by looking at just one potential reason for why the agencies have managed to play a 
central part in an era-defining crisis but continue to post record profits. By looking at what 
serves as a foundation for the generalised understanding that we, as a market-focused society, 
need the agencies, this article has attempted to provide yet another reason for this paradoxical 
industry.  
 
There is little argument to be had regarding the suggestions that rating agencies survive 
because there is, at present, few viable alternatives or that the accuracy of corporate bond 
ratings are so accurate that the inaccuracies of structured bond ratings have been partitioned 
as a separate event (which is a particularly dangerous understanding, but one digresses) to 
name but a few reasons; now, however, it is being claimed that there is an underlying 
sentiment of usefulness that actively supports the continuation and subsequently eliminates 
all alternatives before they are even conceived. As a result of the analysis in this article, it is 
suggested that when we speak of ‘rating agencies’, we do so in a targeted fashion and stick to 
the reality of the situation, which should then begin to change the generalised understandings 
of these massively influential organisations. The Big Two agencies did not just transgress 
alongside a number of other financial actors before 2007, they have been doing so since they 
come into commercialised existence. The Big Two agencies do not act with the interests of 
investors at the forefront of their minds, only non-profit or investor-pays rating agencies can 
do that. Once we begin to systemically focus on the Big Two instead of ‘rating agencies’, the 
picture will dramatically change – not only is it inaccurate to group all rating agencies 
together, it actively prevents smaller, more responsible agencies from growing into a viable 
threat to the hegemony of the Big Two. This ideological underpinning is not a purposeful 
endeavour, as we have seen in this article, but is a syntactic error that the Big Two have 
exploited to the detriment of the financial system, and society moreover; changing this 
                                                 
55 Iain MacNeil ‘Credit Rating Agencies: Regulation and Financial Stability’ in Thomas Cottier, Rosa M Lastra, 
Christian Tietje, Lucia Satragno The Rule of Law in Monetary Affairs (CUP 2014) 180. 
56 Daniel Cash ‘The International Non-Profit Credit Rating Agency: The Viability of a Response’ [2016] 37 The 
Company Lawyer 6. 
understanding can refocus our attention correctly, onto one of the very few key perpetrators 
of the financial crisis. 
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